9, 236-245 ( 1973) of a probability level, e.g., what is the minimum probability of success one should demand in order to select an uncertain but potentially attractive course of action (see the reviews by Cartwright, 1971; Pruitt, 1971a,b; Vinokur, 1971a) . When members discussed some social issue, e.g., was DeGaulle a great leader, the change which resulted was called "polarization"
or "extremization" of opinions (Doise, 1969; Gouge & Fraser. 1972; Moscovici & Zavelloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970 , 1971 . In attempting to explain these effects some theorists concluded that group discussion was unimportant.
The necessary and sufficient condition for producing a shift in choice was that a member recognize his OWII initial position differed (in a specified direction) from the positions of others. Their explanations, therefore, rely on interpersonal comparisons. Other theorists assumed exposure to or participation in discussion was of critical importance. They stressed persuasive argumentation and, to some extent, differcmtial influence or leadership based on such argumentation.
Thcst, two classes of theories make quite different predictions, some of which are discussed below.
The importance of persuasive argumentation in group decision makillq \vas lloted many years ago by Thorndike ( 1938a,b) . It has been various11 used to analyze group-induced shifts in choice by Nordhpry ( 1968 i, St. Jean ( 1970 ), Stoner ( 1968 , Teger and Pruitt ( 1967) . Vinokur ( 1971a.b ). and Vinokur and Burnstein ( 1972) . The \'inokur version as-SIIIII~S that a particular decision elicits a set of standard arguments in support of the various alternatives among which the person must choose. Presumably the arguments reflect certain cultural values engaged by th(, decision. A persuusice argument is thought to be similar in effect to that of a correct solution in group problem solving: once made, it is ver)-likely to be accepted either because it is intrinsically cogent, the membcI who proposes the argument is highly confident of its merits, or both.
The number of arguments available to the nveragc member (or the probability of a particular argument) will vary as a function of the isslles raised by the decision. Thus, faced with a particular choice, a very 1arKe. a moclrrate, or an extremely small number of arguments may come to mind. The extent of the shift in choice a group will induce depends 011 the likelihood that the average member will have available all or most of the persuasive arguments, If the likelihood is very great, then irldivitluals will have already made their initial choice on the basis of all or most of the persuasive arguments. Therefore, not only will they have confidently taken a relatively extreme position beforehand. but they also are unlikely to encounter new persuasive ideas in discussion, ones which had not been considered in making their initial choice. If tlrc likelihood is \-('I-\. small. very few individuals will bcs able to muster strong support BURNSTEIN, VINOKUR, AM) TROPE for their position during discussion, and thus hardly anyone will have a good reason for changing their choice. It follows that the largest shifts will be induced by group discussion when persuasive arguments have a muchute likelihood of being available to the average member.
Among the interpersonal comparison theories, Brown ( RX%), Levinger and Schneider ( EMQ), and Jellison and Riskind ( 1970) assume that an individual contrasts his choice with the average choice of other members; and they predict, for somewhat different reasons, that relatively moderate choices will be changed so as to be equal to or more extreme than this average. Pruitt (1971a) believes the comparison is made with the most extreme member, to the same effect. The incentive for shifting also varies somewhat from theory to theory. For Brown, the member's choice reflects his adherence to cherished social values; a moderate member will change because he wants to demonstrate at least as much adherence as the others. Jellison and Riskind define the choice (of a "risk" level)
as an assertion of ability; because according to social comparison theory, the person wishes to appear slightly more able than others, a shift in choice will be made by the relatively moderate members. Finally, Levinger and Schneider, as well as Pruitt, think the moderate member really wants to take an extreme position but initially suppresses this yearning; the observation that others have made extreme choices legitimizes the desire and allows the member to shift with impunity.
One implication of interpersonal comparison theories is that no shift in choice will occur if members remain ignorant of each other's real preferences; typical shifts will occur, however, when such knowledge becomes available, independent of discussion. Persuasive-argument theory leads one to expect almost the opposite.
Past work on the relative significance of knowledge of other's position and of group discussion had members either discuss without revealing their own choice or reveal their choice without discussing. With the latter paradigm some researchers have observed rather weak shifts (Clark & Willems, 1969; Teger & Pruitt, 1967) , while most have found no shifts at all (Clark et al., 1971; St. 'Jean, 1970; Wallach & Kogan, 1965) . The former procedure produced sizable shifts (Clark et cd., 1971; St. Jean, 1970) . However, reasonably accurate inferences probably could be made about where another member actually stood from what he said in discussion even without his making an explicit statement to that effect.
A recent experiment focusing on these issues obtained results which support the predictions made by persuasive-argument theory and not those made by theories of interpersonal comparison (Burnstein & Vinokur, in press). For instance, it was found that if a member did not know whether others were arguing for their own position or were being forced to support a position contrary to the one they had initially chosen, and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained: however, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to his own (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another's actual choice could be accurately inferred from the position he was required to support in discussion.
There is, however. a more straightforward difference between these two sets of theories which has not yet been examined empirically. III ptinciple, it is a difference which should not be difficult to test by means of a simple factorial design, to wit: one systematically varies the amount of information the subject possesses about others' choices or the positions they have taken independent of the amount of argumentation to which he is exposed in support of these positions. At the very least, interpersonal comparison must predict that considerably more of choice-shift variance will be explained by differences ill information about others' choices than by differences in amount of persuasive argumentation. Theories based on persuasive argumentation, of course, would predict the opposite. More precisely, in the context of an analysis of variauce model. the former theories lead one to expect a main effect based on the amount of information about others' positions or choice, and no main effect for number of arguments; the latter theories demand a main effect for number of arguments and no main effect for number of choices.
This rather simple design, however, poses some technical problems. Although there are a good number of ways to control the amount of information available about others' choices (e.g., SW Burnstcitt CL \7itlokur. in press) the problem of controlling the number of arguments to which an individual is exposed is not so readily solved. For esamplc~, having subjects discuss their choice for different Iengths of timcb is XII obvious method for limiting the amount of argumentation.
Yet this woltld provide only the very crudest control over the actual number of arguments presented during a givrn interval. NevertheIess, it has l)ee~r known for some time that merely exposing a subject to a tape recording of group discussion is sufficient to induce a shift in choice (Kogan & Wallach, 1967; Lamm, 1967 An analysis of variance was performed on shift scores, that is, on the difference between a subject's choice before and after he learned what position others have taken and what arguments they made to support their position. The direction of the shift for a particular CDQ type item is remarkably reliable. Since the magnitude of the shift in choice was at issue and not the direction, shift scores for all four items were combined, irrespective of their direction. A summary of the analysis is shown in Table 1 . The only reliable main effect is based on number of arguments. The items were then broken into those which shift toward "risk" and those which shift toward "caution." Separate analyses of each set reveal main effects for number of arguments. In no instance do effects based on the number of others' choices (positions) approach acceptable levels of statistical significance. A summary of these analyses is given in Table 2 . Mean shifts in choice are presented in Table 3 . On the whole the results strongly support persuasive argument theories. Along with the findings from our earlier study (Burnstein and Vinokur, in press), they imply (the five arguments-five positions cells). At present one can only conjecture about the persistence of weak interpersonal comparison effects, and because these effects were so weak we do not intend to conjecture at length: It may well be the case that when a person reconsiders an initial choice his first preference is to do this in the light of information contained in the arguments-if for no other reason than these statements provide better or more information for evaluating alternatives than the mere choices of others. However, when only the latter are available, they will be put to use. But perhaps not as interpersonal comparison theorists imagine. Thus, knowledge that others' choices are discrepant from his own may induce the person to reconstruct a line of reasoning which he thinks could have produced such choices. That is to say, knowing others have chosen differently stimulates the person to generate arguments which could explain (and thus would support) their choices. Therefore, according to our conjecture, informing the person that others took a position more extreme than his own does not serve so much to threaten his self-esteem or to legitimize some suppressed yearning but rather induces him to find a reasonable explanation for the difference.
